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CHALLENGING PARENTAL
DECISIONS TO OVERTREAT
CHILDREN
Dale L. Mooret
MUCH OF THE DIALOGUE ABOUT medical treatment de-
cisions involving children, particularly infants, has been
dominated by illustrations and discussions of undertreatment.
Examples include the several "Baby Doe" cases, in which par-
ents of handicapped newborns withheld consent for life-saving
treatment, prompting efforts by the federal government to de-
fine undertreatment as tantamount to child abuse or neglect.'
Raised more recently, and in need of examination, is the ques-
tion whether overtreatment should be similarly classified as
child abuse,2 and accordingly constitute grounds for displacing
physician or parental authority over medical decisions. This
Article will explore some of the issues raised by cases of over-
treatment and the implications of superseding parental control.
I. THE "BABY L" CASE
A case study that may be used as a starting point for dis-
cussion of overtreatment issues is that of "Baby L."8 The case
t B.A., J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Professor of Law, Albany Law School; Ad-
junct Professor, Albany Medical College.
1. See President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Re-
port on the Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions, 224-26 & n.95
(Mar. 1983) [hereinafter President's Commission] (discussing the Infant Doe case and the
regulations issued in its wake, creating inter alia a "hot-line" 800 telephone number to
report instances of undertreatment).
2. See Rasa Gustaitis, Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 81 PEDIATRICS
317, 321 (1988) (arguing that child abuse and neglect laws could be used to prevent futile
life-supporting treatment).
3. See John J. Paris et al., Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case
of Baby L, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1012, 1012-13 (1990) (discussing the facts of the
"Baby L" case in its first reported form). See also Gina Kolata, Battle Over a Baby's
Future Raises Hard Ethical Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1994, at Al, A12 (discussing the
similar case involving Ryan Nguyen in Oregon).
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raises substantive questions about defining medical care as "fu-
tile" or "inhumane," as well as procedural questions concerning
the appropriate party to apply the definitions.
Baby L was two years old at the time her case went to
court. Baby L was born after thirty-six weeks of gestation,
weighing 1970 grams. Numerous problems manifested them-
selves prior to, during, and after her delivery. For example,
during gestation she developed an obstructed kidney, and dur-
ing labor she experienced heart-rate decreases and showed
other signs of significant fetal distress.4 Her Apgar scores (a
measure of physical condition immediately after delivery) 5
were poor. She required resuscitation and mechanical ventila-
tion, suffered seizures, and was unresponsive except to painful
stimuli. At one month of age Baby L underwent surgery for the
insertion of a feeding tube. A tracheostomy was performed
when she was seven months old. When she finally was dis-
charged from the hospital, at fourteen months of age, she re-
quired around-the-clock nursing care. Only two weeks after
discharge, she was readmitted to the hospital. Baby L was in
and out of the hospital for the next several months for various
illnesses, including pneumonia and septic shock. At twenty-
three months of age, she entered the hospital, needing both
mechanical ventilation and intravenous medication to support
her cardiac function. Baby L's mother insisted throughout this
time that "everything possible be done to ensure [her] child's
survival."'
The substantive issues raised by the case were identified by
Baby L's caregivers, who, after much discussion,7 eventually
reached the conclusion that "further medical intervention was
not in the best interests of the patient [because it] would sub-
ject the child to additional pain without affecting the underly-
4. Paris et al., supra note 3, at 1012 (discussing the baby's problems during preg-
nancy and delivery, including the presence of meconium below her vocal cords).
5. See THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1979 (Robert Berkow
ed., 16th ed. 1992) (explaining that the Apgar scoring system measures an infant's color,
heart rate, respiration, reflexes, and muscle tone, with low scores often associated with
residual neurological damage).
6. Paris et al., supra note 3, at 1013 (discussing the mother's desire to keep the child
alive).
7. Parties to the discussions included the chiefs of the services involved in Baby L's
care, primary care physicians, nurses, the hospital's attorney, and the chair of the institu-
tional ethics committee.
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ing condition or ultimate outcome."8 As those who reported
this case further explained, "unless a reversal or amelioration
of the underlying condition could be expected, painful interven-
tions would be futile and inhumane." 9
The procedural question regarding the appropriate deci-
sionmaker in such a case is answered by the authors' of the
Baby L case study in discussing the relative responsibilities of
caregivers and patients or their families:
It is the physician, not the patient, who must sort out the
possibilities, weigh the pros and cons, and recommend a
course of action. That responsibility should not be shifted
onto the 'shoulders of the patient in a misguided attempt to
respect autonomy. The patient or family can of course accept
or reject the physician's recommendation. They are not free,
however, to design their own treatment; nor is the physician
bound to provide it.10
Baby L's mother, however, apparently disagreed with both
the substantive and procedural conclusions of the caregivers.
She sought legal counsel who initiated a court proceeding seek-
ing an order to force physicians to continue treatment." In the
meantime, Baby L's condition stabilized somewhat and she was
able to breathe without the assistance of a ventilator. Her
mother, however, continued to press the demand that mechani-
cal ventilation be employed in the event of a relapse. Accord-
ingly, a court hearing was held. A hypothetical question from
the judge elicited a response from the physicians' attorney stat-
ing that if the judge were to issue an order requiring mechani-
cal ventilation, the physicians would decline to comply because
obeying it would violate their ethical obligations to the
patient.12
Failure to comply with such an order would be risky busi-
ness, as courts take contempt of their orders quite seriously.
That point of contempt was never reached, however. As is typi-
cal in legal cases involving patients who are unable to speak for
themselves, the judge in this case had appointed a guardian ad
litem to represent Baby L. A guardian ad litem's responsibility
8. Paris et al., supra note 3, at 1013 (discussing opinions of Baby L's caregivers).
9. Id. (discussing the medical team's actions in the Baby L case).
10. Id. (discussing the patient-physician relationship).
11. Id. (discussing events leading to the litigation of the Baby L case).
12. Id. (discussing response by caretakers' attorney if the court had issued an order
for mechanical ventilation).
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is to inquire about the facts of a case and to outline for the
judge a resolution that is in the best interests of the party who
is unable to speak for herself. Guardians ad litem are especially
needed in cases like Baby L's, since the attorneys before the
court are championing the views of their own clients, in this
case the mother and the physicians, rather than acting as an
advocate for the patient.
The guardian ad litem contacted a pediatric neurologist
who was willing to acquiesce in the wishes of Baby L's mother
and assume the child's care.13 As of 1990, when the case study
was published, Baby L was still alive, retaining the mental sta-
tus of a three-month old child, in a blind, deaf, and
quadriplegic state.
The authors who reported the Baby L case study empha-
sized two points: that the physician's obligation is to his or her
patient rather than others, including families; and that it is im-
portant to protect the physician's fight to follow his or her con-
science, even when to do so means rejecting the demand of a
patient or surrogate.14 They also admonished caregivers to ob-
serve substantive and procedural safeguards in such cases. The
substantive focus of any decision must be the patient's best in-
terests; the presumption is that those interests will be served by
respecting the family's wishes in favor of continuing treatment.
Minimal procedural requirements for reversing that presump-
tion include "agreement among health care workers, the con-
currence of an ethics committee, openness to a second opinion,
and a comprehensive note in the patient's chart detailing all the
factors considered in the decision."15
II. SOME RESPONSES TO THE BABY L CASE
After this account of the Baby L case appeared in the
New England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of Per-
inatology solicited and published commentary from several
13. Cf. Robert M. Veatch & Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of
the Physician in Setting Limits, 18 Am. J. L. & MED. 15, 34 (1992) (asserting that even if
another colleague is willing to prolong care, the former physician's concern for the infant
should not end).
14. Paris et al., supra note 3, at 1014 (discussing a physician's right to follow his or
her medical judgment even if contrary to the pleas of patients' families).
15. Id. at 1014 (discussing the minimal requirements for reversing the presumption
of respecting the family's wishes).
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members of its editorial board.'6 Although the views of some
respondents are difficult to characterize, all of them seemed
sympathetic to the plight of the physicians involved in caring
for Baby L. More respondents than not either agreed with, or
at least defended, the approach taken by Baby L's physicians.
Others, however, forewent the opportunity to take a position.
One commentator expressed concern about defining ventilatory
treatment as "futile" in Baby L's case and stressed the impor-
tance of not "misus[ing] the language of futility to mask qual-
ity of life judgments."17 Another, however, focused on the occa-
sional inability of parents "to appreciate that their decisions..
. may not serve the best interests of the child, and indeed may
prolong pain, suffering, and the act of dying."' 8 These state-
ments, while highlighting different aspects of the case, are con-
sistent with each other. The concept of futility should not be
used to hide value judgments or to displace as decisionmakers
parents who are attentive to the best interests of their children.
On the other hand, when appropriate, demands for overtreat-
ment that disregard a child's best interests should be chal-
lenged and resisted.
III. FUTILE AND INHUMANE: SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES IN THE BABY L CASE
Were mechanical ventilation and other rescue-oriented in-
terventions for Baby L "futile?" After all, it is not obligatory,
legally or morally, to offer futile treatment. The difficulty, of
course, is not in stating the principle, which is well-accepted,
but with the identification of those treatments that fall into the
category of "futile." Certainly a treatment that will not work,
because it "will not produce the effect being envisioned,"' 9 is
futile by even the most restrictive definition. This concept,
sometimes referred to as "physiological futility,"20 may be il-
lustrated by an example drawn from my experience caring for
16. See Point-Counterpoint: Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment, 10 J.
PEIUNATOLOGY 407, 407-15 (1990).
17. Id. at 407 (for the views of Alan R. Fleisehman).
18. Id. at 414 (for the views of Gerald Nathenson).
19. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 13, at 18 (arguing that providers and insurers are
not obligated to provide care with no relevant effect).
20. Stuart J. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094, 2094 (1988) (dis-
cussing the circumstances under which life-sustaining interventions may be limited without
the informed consent of the patient or family).
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a patient with permanent renal failure. This particular patient
had been receiving hemodialysis several times each week when
he suffered from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm and was ren-
dered comatose. This incident occurred prior to the Medicare
program's funding of hemodialysis, when dialysis was still be-
ing rationed because the machines were in a shorter supply
than could adequately meet the demand. Because of this pa-
tient's dismal neurological status, he was no longer considered
a candidate for receiving hemodialysis. Accordingly, he re-
mained in the intensive care unit (ICU), comatose, and at-
tached to a ventilator, but he was not receiving hemodialysis.
Without dialysis, the potassium level in his blood would inexo-
rably rise to the point where cardiac arrest would be inevitable.
His attending physician, however, refused to issue a "do not
resuscitate" directive. Rather, he expressly ordered resuscita-
tion in the event of a cardiac arrest, perhaps because he feared
that in the absence of such a command, the ICU nurses and
house staff would not initiate such undoubtedly futile activity.
The patient sustained a cardiac arrest during my shift on duty,
and the ensuing resuscitation attempt was a clear example of
treatment that is "futile" in the "physiologically futile" sense:
it simply did not (and was not destined to) work.
The concept of physiological futility, however, does not ad-
equately explain the Baby L case. Neither mechanical ventila-
tion, nor other rescue measures, when administered to her dur-
ing crises, could be characterized as futile in that narrow sense.
Whether these treatments should be regarded as "inhumane,"
however, is a closer question. After all, Baby L apparently re-
mained capable of experiencing pain despite her compromised
condition.21 That aspect distinguishes this case from that of
Baby K,2 2 whose mother also has insisted that caregivers con-
tinue to provide aggressive rescue measures for her child. Baby
K is anencephalic, which means that she has no conscious expe-
rience of pain and suffering. Thus, while resuscitative measures
21. Paris et al., supra note 3, at 1013 (discussing the extent of Baby L's neurological
defects resulting in her ability to experience only pain).
22. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91
(1994) (holding that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act obligates
hospitals to provide treatment to an anencephalic infant brought to the hospital in respira-
tory distress).
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arguably provide her with no benefit, it is harder to describe
such measures as "inhumane."
IV. WHO SHOULD APPLY THE DEFINITIONS: THE
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
The procedural question, of course, is who should be as-
signed the responsibility of deciding whether the treatment is
futile or inhumane and whether it should be withheld or with-
drawn? As in many other cases, the answer to the procedural
question in the case of Baby L controls the substantive out-
come. Certainly her caregivers would decide one way, and her
mother the other. Some would argue that the determination
whether treatment is "futile" is solely a medical responsibil-
ity.23 Provided that the definition of "futile" is limited strictly
to treatments that simply will not work, this assignment of re-
sponsibility is probably not controversial. If, however, the sub-
stantive concept of futility is expanded to encompass treatment
that cannot cure an underlying condition or illness yet remains
effective in maintaining a "diminished" quality of life, respond-
ing to the procedural question becomes much more problem-
atic. One reason is that "[m]edical diagnoses, prognoses, and
judgments regarding the efficacy of interventions are inherently
uncertain and appeals to futility mask poor communication
with patients, providing a subterfuge for supplanting patient
values with caregiver values and hiding a power struggle be-
tween patients and their physicians. '"24
V. FEDERAL REGULATORY MODEL
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
in promulgating various versions of the "Baby Doe" regula-
tions, has responded to some of the substantive and procedural
questions raised by controversial treatment decisions. The pre-
sent version of these regulations, issued pursuant to the federal
23. See Lance K. Stell, Stopping Treatment on Grounds of Futility: A Role for
Institutional Policy, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 481, 492 (1992) (asserting that the
medical responsibility for determining futility is well-founded in legal and medical princi-
ples). See also Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (1983) (holding that a
doctor's refusal to continue treatment, though intentional and with knowledge the patient
would die, does not violate any legal obligation to the patient).
24. Stell, supra note 23, at 492-93 (asserting objections to the premise that physi-
cians should be able to withhold treatment solely on the grounds of futility).
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Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Act,2 5 is
procedurally and substantively much less intrusive than the
original version, issued in 1982 pursuant to the federal Reha-
bilitation Act.2 6 The same rationale, however, appears to un-
derlie both versions of regulations: that the presumption in
favor of parental decisionmaking for children cannot always be
honored. Deference to parental decisionmaking is based on the
belief that, in general, parents will make their children's medi-
cal decisions on the basis of the children's best interests. In the
case of newborns who are seriously ill due to prematurity, or
who are born with handicapping conditions, however, parental
choices in favor of nontreatment (or "conservative" treatment)
are suspect and perhaps unworthy of the deference traditionally
accorded to parental decisions. The reason seems to lie in a
concern that such nontreatment decisions may be tainted by
considerations other than the best interests of the child, for ex-
ample the economic or emotional well-being of the rest of the
family.
Since "medical neglect" of an infant triggers intervention,
the substantive component of the federal regulations attempts
to delineate that concept.27 In large part, this delineation is ac-
complished by defining what falls outside the scope of "medical
neglect." According to the regulations, "medical neglect" does
not include failing to provide treatment28 to an infant on the
basis of a "reasonable medical judgment" that (1) the infant is
"chronically and irreversibly comatose," or (2) treatment
"would merely prolong dying, [would] not be effective in ame-
liorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening condi-
tions, or [would] otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of
the infant," or (3) "treatment would be virtually futile in terms
25. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.1-.20 (1994) (implementing the Child Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment Act).
26. See President's Commission, supra note 1 (noting that § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 treats Down Syndrome as a handicap, although that section had been
used only once for newborns with congenital anomalies prior to the Indiana Infant Doe
case). But see Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 647 (1986) (holding that the
regulations issued under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were invalid because they
exceeded the authority conferred by Congress under § 504).
27. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(1) (1993) (stating that withholding "medically indicated
treatment from a disabled infant with a life-threatening condition" constitutes medical
neglect).
28. Id. § 1340.15(b)(2) (excluding "appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication"
from the term treatment in this context).
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of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such
circumstances would be inhumane."29 The procedural compo-
nent of the regulations calls for an enforcement mechanism to
be created by each state's child protective services system.30
These regulations shed little additional light on the murky
concept of futility. The interpretative guidelines accompanying
the regulations, however, explain "inhumane" treatment as in-
volving significant medical contraindications and/or significant
pain and suffering that clearly outweigh the very slight poten-
tial benefit for an infant highly unlikely to survive. 1 This defi-
nition is helpful in that it provides the criterion for distinguish-
ing "inhumane" treatment from "futile" treatment -
significant pain and suffering disproportionate to any potential
benefit. In a case such as Baby L's, for example, the concern
about inflicting pain may provide an independent reason for
challenging the continuation of treatment.
Two additional significant features of the substantive as-
pects of these regulations should be noted. One is their heavy
reliance on "reasonable medical judgment[s]" '32 in determining
that certain conditions, such as the futility or inhumaneness of
a particular treatment, have been satisfied. The other signifi-
cant feature, which is more critical to the present discussion, is
that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment under these
conditions is permissive, not mandatory. This feature is no
doubt a reflection of the regulators' and legislators' predomi-
nant concern with undertreatment and medical neglect, and not
with overtreatment and affirmative abuse. Nonetheless, cases
like that of Baby L force our attention to a question that paral-
lels the one addressed by the regulations: When does overtreat-
ment become abusive, constituting justification for displacing
parental and/or physician authority over medical decisions? 3
29. Id. See also John M. Freeman & Peggy C. Ferry, New Brain Death Guidelines
In Children: Further Confusion, 81 PEDIATRICS 301, 301 (1988) (offering a somewhat dif-
ferent articulation of the regulations).
30. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c) (1994) (requiring mechanisms within a state's child pro-
tective service system to facilitate responses to the reporting of medical neglect).
31. Id. § 1340 app. 1 9 (noting this determination is an appropriate factor for a
physician to consider in selecting among possible treatments).
32. See id. (emphasizing the importance of "reasonable medical judgment").
33. See Gustaitis, supra note 2, at 320 (arguing that physicians should be permitted
to act on behalf of an infant and advocate nontreatment even if the parents desire pro-
longed treatment if the physician determines that the treatment would be futile and cause
unjustifiable suffering).
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VI. OVERTREATMENT AS CHILD ABUSE
"If parents insist on continuing treatment and physicians
know it to be futile and a cause of unjustifiable suffering, the
Do No Harm principle will oblige physicians to act in the
baby's behalf, despite parental opposition." 4 It seems that the
case of Baby L may be just such a case. And it also seems that
serious consideration should be given to other such cases under
the rubric of prevention or cessation of child abuse.
One might wonder who is ready to take such a step, how-
ever. Consider, for example, an article published in 1990,
which reports the experience of a neonatal ethics committee in
a tertiary care hospital.3 The committee deliberated about the
treatment of infants suffering from congenital anomalies. The
authors report that "[g]enerally, in the experience of our
group, when the infant's condition appears hopeless but the
parents wish to continue care for their infant, treatment is con-
tinued for a period of time to allow the parents to come to
terms with the hopelessness of their infant's condition."3 6 But if
overtreatment is, at least in some cases, abusive, then how long
should parents be permitted to use their infant as a means to
their own ends of "coming to terms with the hopelessness" of
the situation? After all, during the time it takes them to "come
to terms," their child may well experience pain caused by the
continued treatment. Moreover, the parents ultimately may be
unable to "come to terms" with that reality of hopelessness. At
some point, most likely sooner rather than later, the infant's
interests should absolutely supersede those of his or her par-
ents. The remaining questions, then, are how and by what stan-
dards should the decision to supplant parental authority
proceed?
34. Id. (noting it is usually the parents who advocate a less aggressive treatment).
35. Myra J. Edens et al., Neonatal Ethics: Development of a Consultative Group, 86
PEDIATRICS 944, 944-47 (1990) (noting the advisory group was created in response to sev-
eral court cases and proposed federal regulations concerning treatment of potentially hand-
icapped infants).
36. Id. at 947 (noting there are a few exceptions to this general observation). See
also Gustaitis, supra note 2, at 319 (reporting that it is not uncommon to maintain life-
support equipment on a child until the parents are better able to cope with the concept of
death).
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VII. AN APPROACH TO CASES OF
OVERTREATMENT
It is assumed that cases involving overtreatment indeed oc-
cur and are undesirable. They may in fact be more common
than not, simply because federal regulations on infant care
have bolstered the already existing instinct of physicians to res-
cue rather than abandon their patients. In addition, the na-
tional climate of concern about protecting rights of the disabled
would make even the appearance of a discriminatory treatment
decision highly unattractive.
A second assumption underlying this discussion is that
where uncertainty about a diagnosis or prognosis exists, treat-
ment should be provided while the uncertainties are being re-
solved. Physicians should not be reluctant to initiate treatment
for fear that once initiated it cannot be withdrawn. The more
appealing plan is to decide doubtful cases in favor of treatment,
at least until the diagnosis and prognosis have been clarified.87
VIII. SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE APPROACH
TO OVERTREATMENT
Medical treatment is sometimes painful and often poses
risks. A parent may nonetheless choose to expose a child to
such medical treatment, despite its dangers, because a decision
favoring treatment serves the best interests of the child. The
pain experienced by the child may even be bearable to contem-
plate, if the potential for rescuing the child and restoring
health is present. In some cases, however, the potential for re-
storing health is absent. In those cases, should a parent's de-
mand for continued treatment be resisted on the basis that such
treatment disserves the child's interests? To answer this ques-
tion, it is useful to outline the factors that should be considered
in evaluating a child's best interests.
As with adults, the assessment of the child's best inter-
ests should include consideration of the uniqueness and dig-
nity of every person; the possibility and extent of preserving
the patient's life; preservation, improvement, or restoration of
the patient's health or functioning; relief of the patient's suf-
37. Pieter J.J. Sauer, Ethical Decisions in Neonatal Intensive Care Units: The Dutch
Experience, 90 PEDIATRIcS 729, 730 (1992) (noting that moral obligations require further
treatment when the effect of the treatment is unclear).
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fering; and such other factors that a reasonable person in the
patient's medical and personal circumstances would want
considered. Decisions for an adult often reflect upon the
adult's life style to determine the values or views that should
inform decisionmaking. In contrast, a judgment for a child is
more forward-looking: it focuses on the child's potential and
the opportunity for future development.3 8
Valuing the "uniqueness and dignity of every person"
would suggest, at the very least, that a child should not be used
as the means to achieve even the worthwhile end of allowing
his or her parents to "come to terms" with a hopeless progno-
sis. The desire to provide "relief of the patient's suffering"
would call for an end to inhumane treatment, that is, treatment
causing pain and suffering disproportionate to any potential
benefit."9 This analysis would support the action of the
caregivers in challenging continued treatment for Baby L.
Standing alone, however, this analysis would not support the
action of the caregivers who challenged continued treatment
for Baby K, given the absence of any suggestion that continued
treatment was inhumane.
IX. CONCLUSION: PROCEDURAL APPROACHES TO
OVERTREATMENT
By what means should a challenge to overtreatment be
made, and should such a challenge be mandatory or permis-
sive? If inhumane overtreatment is indeed abusive, it would
seem that a challenge should be mandatory. It should not be
made lightly, of course; safeguards of the sort stressed in the
reports on Baby L are critical.40 Added to those safeguards
should be a requirement that vigorous efforts at persuasion
show themselves to be of no avail before a more open challenge
is made.41 The vehicle for such a challenge could parallel that
38. New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Others Must Choose
121 (1992) (emphasis added).
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (indicating it is solely the effect upon
the pain and suffering of the child that should concern the physician in assessing whether
to administer treatment).
40. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing safeguards for the preven-
tion of overtreatment).
41. Personal experience with a bioethics committee and consultation service leads me
to believe that most, though not all, apparently irreconcilable differences can be resolved
without coercive measures.
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which already exists for undertreatment cases; that is, through
a report to the state's child protective services agency made
mandatory rather than permissive, by amending the federal
regulations regarding inhumane treatment. Finally, although I
am loath to suggest a judicial forum for such a challenge, it
should be available as a matter of last resort.

